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STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

PEACE OPERATIONS AND THEIR IMPACT ON COMBAT READINESS

BY

LIEUTENANT COLONEL JOSEPH P. NIZOLAK, JR. United States Army


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USAWC CLASS OF 1999

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USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

Peace Operations and Their Impact on Combat Readiness

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ABSTRACT

AUTHOR: Joseph P. Nizolak, Jr., LTC(P), FA

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The "Respond" portion of US Military strategy "Shape, Respond, Prepare Now" along with post Cold War downsizing has transformed the Armed Forces of the United States into a force projection military. Every commander, leader, and soldier must be trained and ready to deploy and fight with minimum notice. The "Shape" portion of our military strategy has resulted in numerous deployments to conduct Peace Operations where we are focused on not fighting but preventing war. We often hear that future combat will be "come as you are" wars with little if any time to ramp-up our warfighting skills to their highest levels. This requirement demands that our forces be focused on their warfighting tasks. There are only so many training days available to a peacetime army...241 once weekends and holidays are stripped out. For a deployment force on a Support-Mission-Training cycle has those 241 days are reduced to 161. The average peace operation deployment time for the Class of 1999 was 145 days. Subtracting the weekends from these 145 days to allow a better comparison leaves 105 days which reduces the training days for a unit deployed on a peace operation to 56 days! Is preparation for and conduct of Peace Operations reducing our readiness to perform our primary mission - to fight and win our nations wars? This paper analyzes the Peace Operations experiences of US Army War College students, our military's future senior leaders, with regards to how they view the impact of Peace Operations on readiness. Using survey results from the 1997, 1998, and 1999 resident classes, we find a changing attitude concerning Peace Operations, their effect on readiness, and their role in preparing our forces to fight and win the next war.

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SHAPE, RESPOND, AND PREPARE NOW FOR THE FUTURE

Since the end of the Cold War, and the subsequent end of the Soviet Empire, the United States, the sole remaining superpower, has become the world's power broker or policeman. This debatably enviable position has and will continue to involve U.S. forces in numerous peace operations around the world. Current U.S. policy concerning use of military forces in peace operations pits the requirements of the National Security Strategy, the currently identified U.S. national interests, and budget constraints against each other presenting a no-win situation. Don Snider notes in his essay on current civilmilitary relations, "... the military leadership will continue to be forced to choose internally between financing OOTW or supporting the traditional warfighting roles and their urgently needed modernization." This study reinforces this quandary faced by current military leaders.

U.S. policy concerning peace operations is formalized in Presidential Decision Directive 25 (PDD 25), "U.S. Policy on Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations", dated 3 May 1994. The policy was a direct result of an interagency review of U.S. peacekeeping policies and programs² and quite possibly recent U.S. experiences with UN peace operations in Somalia.

Derived directly from the National Security Strategy (NSS), the National Military Strategy (NMS) is to Shape, Respond, and

Prepare Now.³ The "Shape" portion of our military strategy reflects the intent of the NSS guided by the policy found in PDD 25. We promote stability through peacetime engagement activities.⁴ Arguably, our current Armed Forces primary peacetime engagement activity is peace operations that involve numerous units, thousands of Department of Defense personnel, and cost billions of dollars annually. The cumulative mandate of the NSS and the NMS, guided by PDD 25, has resulted in numerous deployments to conduct peace operations where we are focused on not fighting but preventing war.

The "Respond" portion of the NMS along with post Cold War downsizing has transformed the Armed Forces of the United States into a force projection military. Every commander, leader, and soldier must be trained and ready to deploy and fight with minimum notice, even from a posture of global engagement, such as a peace operation. The gauntlet thrown down to our military is how to ""Prepare Now" for the Major Theater War while being decisively engaged in numerous peace operations.

PEACE OPERATIONS AND THE READINESS CHALLENGE

It should be apparent to anyone in the U.S. Armed Forces that peace operations are going to remain our primary occupation for the foreseeable future. The 1998 National Security Strategy, the National Military Strategy and Presidential

Decision Directive 25 make this clear. Also clear is the requirement to be able to deter and defeat nearly simultaneous, large-scale, cross-border aggression in two distant theaters.⁶

If, for the time being, we dismiss other arguments and focus on the training days available to a <u>peacetime army</u> we find there are 241 once weekends and holidays are stripped out. A rapid deployment force, which all but three of our active Army divisions are 7, on a Support-Mission-Training cycle has those 241 days are reduced to 1618. The average peace operation deployment time for the Class of 1999 was 145 days. Subtracting the weekends from these 145 days to allow a better comparison leaves 105 days, which reduces the available training days for a rapid deployment unit on a peace operation to 56 days!

Can we accomplish our assigned peace operations missions and still "Prepare Now" for the MTW as required by NMS under these conditions? Are we sure either way? Are we assessing readiness of units deployed on peace operations to ensure they are ready? This paper seeks to examine this dilemma using as a vehicle a survey of Army War College students, the future senior leaders of our military, and determine if current peace "operations—TEMPO" is rendering our military "not combat ready" to Respond.

METHODOLOGY OVERVIEW

This research project is an ongoing effort, which currently incorporates survey results from three different Army War College classes - 1997, 1998, and 1999. By continuing to collect, validate, and refine survey questions and responses, we can draw conclusions as to the effect numerous and recurring Peace Operations are having on warfighting readiness and correlate these conclusions with similar studies conducted by Rand, the Government Accounting Office (GAO), and others.

The initial project titled <u>Informing the Debate: The Impact</u> of Operations Other Than War on Combat Training Readiness by LTC Alan Landry used a survey of twenty-seven questions (Appendix A: 1997 Survey). The survey divided the questions into four focus areas: population data, pre-deployment, training readiness during the OOTW, and post-deployment. The 1998 project titled Operations Other Than War and Its Impact on Combat Training Readiness by LTC Michael J. Walsh updated the survey including adding two questions concerning common skills training (e.g., weapons qualification, NBC proficiency, etc.) and physical fitness (Appendix B: 1998 Survey).

For this year's effort I re-titled the project in order to reflect the current doctrinal term 'Peace Operations'. Peace operations encompass peacekeeping operations, peace enforcement operations, and other operations conducted to support diplomatic

efforts to establish and maintain peace. I again updated the survey to improve clarity for data collection and added three questions concerning peace operations effect on unit morale, reenlistment rates, and junior officer retention.

I distributed 320 copies of the survey, one to every member of the class of 1999. I received 97 responses (30%) with the following mix: 76 Active Army, 6 Army Reserve, 2 Army National Guard, 2 Department of the Army Civilians, 4 Active Air Force, 2 Air National Guard, 3 Active Navy, 1 Active Marine, 1 DOD Civilian. I entered the responses from these surveys into a Microsoft® Access 97 database. You can find the survey in Appendix C with survey results in Appendix D. I then analyzed, compared, and contrasted the responses from the USAWC classes of 1997, 1998, and 1999. Some interesting trends emerged from this analysis from which I drew my conclusions.

CLASS OF 1999 SURVEY POPULATION

As in past years, the responses for this year's class show a wide range of experiences with peace operations. The total number of surveys returned in 1999 was 24% less than in 1998, however the 30% return from the class still provides a solid sampling to compare with previous years and to begin some meaningful trend analysis. Of the 97 respondents, 50 participated in at least one peace operation during their

careers and 47 did not. Of those that participated 34 participated in one peace operation, 11 participated in two peace operations, four participated in three peace operations, and one participated in five peace operations. The average deployment on these operations was 145 days, almost 5 months.

Comparing both the number and type of peace operations between the classes yields some interesting results. The percentage of the class of 1999 that participated in one or more peace operations, 51%, was down from the percentage of the two previous classes. In the class of 1997 63% participated in at least one peace operation during their career and the percentage was 69% for the Class of 1998.

Peace Operations by Class




Figure 1 Peace Operations by Class

As shown in Figure 2, the type of peace operations that the majority of each class participated in also varied. The type of operation that the majority (48%) of the current class found itself deployed on was peace enforcement, primarily Operation Joint Endeavor. The class of 1997 was predominantly involved with humanitarian assistance (41%) and the class of 1998 with traditional peacekeeping (38%).




Figure 2: Type of Peace Operation by Class

Figure 3 shows the type of units represented in this year's survey population is distributed almost equally among the standard organizations: combat (light & heavy), combat support, combat service support, SOF, health services, and TDA. Twentynine members participated as battalion, squadron, or task force commanders. Twenty-three members participated as battalion or

higher level staffs. The remaining positions ranged from helicopter crewmember to Staff Judge Advocate.




Figure 3: Unit Type Class 1999

SECTION I: PRE-DEPLOYMENT

Once I gathered the basic population information I wanted to find out the class' experience while preparing for the peace operation. How well did their "go-to-war" METL tasks suit the requirements of the peace operation on which they were about to embark? How ready were they to execute a MTW mission and how was that assessed? What special training did they undergo to get ready for the peace operation.

The majority of the class reported that none or few of their METLs included the tasks they needed to master to conduct the assigned peace operations. This corresponds to the responses of the class of 1998, though more of that class (30% vice 9%) felt

that at least some of their METL tasks supported their peace operation. However, this trend is not reflected in the first year of the survey where over 60% felt that most or all of their METL tasks supported the requirements of the peace operation.




Figure 4: Peace Operations Tasks Included in Unit METL

Next the study asked a corresponding question that seeks to refine the previous question. Did the peace operation require critical tasks not listed in your unit METL? Thirty -seven percent of the class answered "YES" and provided numerous examples found in Appendix E. This also correlates with the results of the previous two years (38% and 41% respectively). By merging the results of the previous question with this one, you can conclude that units must quickly train for critical, unfamiliar tasks prior to peace operations in order to accomplish their mission. This requirement also indicates that

they will be neglecting some of their "go-to-war" METL skills while attaining proficiency here.

The responses to the next question identified how the units did prepare for the operation. Thirty-five percent of the current class used their normal METL training, while 39% used special "ramp-up" training that averaged four weeks in duration. The remaining used OJT (18%) or other (7%), to which the respondents specified that they did no train up due to the mission being given as a no notice deployment (primarily Uphold Democracy in Haiti).

The 1997 and 1998 respondents said they used ramp-up and OJT at about the same level as this years class. Ramp-up for 1997 was 30% and 38% for 1998; OJT was 16% for 1997 and 11% for 1998. However, compared to the previous two years, the percentage of respondents using METL training to prepare for the peace operation greatly decreased. In 1997 fifty-three percent used METL training and in 1998 fifty-one percent did. This decrease in use of METL training to prepare for a peace operation validates the previous data that units recognize the deficiency of their "go-to-war" METL tasks to satisfy peace operations requirements. What it also means is even less time devoted to training "go-to-war" METL tasks when a unit receives a peace operation mission.




Figure 5: Pre-deployment Combat Readiness

As shown in Figure 5, most respondents believed that their units were combat ready at the time of deployment. However, the current class indicated an 11% increase in the number who believed they had minor shortfalls. This would indicate that numerous, repetitive deployments for peace operations are taking a toll on combat readiness

Once combat readiness was assessed, the study looked at a unit's pre-deployment readiness to perform their assigned mission. There was a significant decrease in the number who believed their unit was fully trained to perform the peace operation. As shown in Figure 6, this trend is consistent for all three years.




Figure 6: Readiness to Perform Peace Operation

The study further broke the 1999 data down by the type of unit. This analysis shows that fully 50% of the respondents from combat units believed they deployed to the peace operation with significant training shortfalls.




Figure 7: Readiness to Perform Peace Operation by Unit Type

A key question as we look at this data is, was this readiness assessed and how was it done? In the vast majority of the units, the respondents reported that an assessment had been done to indicate the unit's level of readiness to perform its mission. When a unit's readiness was a subjective assessment, 37% of the assessments were performed by the unit commander, 20% were performed by the next higher level commander, and the remaining 43% were performed by a commander two levels up.




Figure 8: Primary Assessment Means for Readiness

There are two trends that appear in this data. A long-term trend is the decrease in the number of formal evaluations; the commander's assessment as the source of evaluation has been increasing and this year was the primary source. The second trend is the increase in the number of units not assessed. The

1998 results showed a marked decrease from the previous year, however the 1999 results showed a gain over 1997!

The data obtained from the pre-deployment questions shows that units are confident of their go-to-war readiness and they recognize that their unit METL does not adequately address the requirements for peace operations. Once assigned a peace operations mission, the concentrate on peace operations tasks at the expense of their unit METL. Even while more units are using non-METL training to prepare for peace operations, they, especially combat arms units, still feel less ready to perform the peace operation mission than their combat mission.

SECTION II: PEACE OPERATION DEPLOYMENT

The study next examined units during the peace operations deployment. I was interested in any METL or non-METL training opportunities that were available while deployed on a peace operation. This was important because according to FM 25-101, Training the Force the US Army's doctrinal manual on training, proficiency in METL related skills are extremely perishable. Readiness would greatly decrease during the average deployment experienced by this population (approximately five months) if no METL training occurred. This would jeopardize a unit's ability to rapidly deploy from a peace operation to an MTW as required by the National Military Strategy.




Figure 9: METL Training Opportunities Compared to Home Station

When comparing METL training opportunities during peace operations with home station, it was not surprising that the majority responded that the opportunities were less, much less, or non-existent. After all, deployment on a peace operation does not support the conduct of training on warfighting METL skills. What was surprising was that there was an increase in the percentage of this year's class that responded that their METL training opportunities were greater or much greater than at home station. This could be due to the majority of this class' experience being with peace enforcement, which is closer to combat operations.




Figure 10: METL Training Opportunities by Unit Type

The study then checked to see if the trend towards increased METL training opportunities held across the unit types. As seen in Figure 10, a large percentage of all but combat and health service units responded that METL training opportunities were greater or much greater. It seems logical for certain combat support, combat service support, TDA, and SOF units to respond this way. Peace enforcement tasks would seem to complement if not replicate METL tasks of military police, logisticians, and SOF units.

What about non-METL training such as the tasks required for the peace operation? As seen in Figure 11, almost two-thirds of the respondents saw little or no opportunity to train non-METL tasks.




Figure 11: Other Training Opportunities During Peace Operations

To complete the look at the training opportunities during peace operations the study asked if there was any opportunity to conduct any common task type training (e.g., weapons qualification, physical training, NBC, etc.). Over half the respondents for this year's survey had little to no training opportunity, while 60% of the 1998 respondents reported having good opportunities to conduct this type of training.




Figure 12: CTT Training Opportunities During Peace Operations

Looking at all the responses concerning training opportunities it is clear that overall 60% of the senior leaders participating in these operations saw little opportunity to train their soldiers. While the peace operations skills may be sustained through daily use, there is little opportunity to reinforce or validate the level of proficiency. Worse is the situation with combat METL collective and individual skills that are allowed to degrade over the average five-month deployment.

Having collected the data on training, I now wanted to assess the overall impact of the peace operation on the unit's combat readiness. While the majority of those surveyed indicated that the peace operation degraded their combat readiness, the data showed a slight trend towards a decreasing negative impact on overall readiness. This could be attributed to the type of peace operations that the majority of the class of 1999 participated in (peace enforcement), the typical can-do attitude reflected in the military culture, or a resignation to the fact that our nation's military strategy for the foreseeable future will have us engaged in this type of operation. If the latter case is true it could be yielding a second order effect of changing the benchmark on what constitutes readiness.




Figure 13: Overall impact on Combat Readiness

With this information the study checked to see if the same trend held up for the class of 1999 across the unit types.

Figure 14 displays this information. The majority of the respondents from combat and combat service support units were in line with 49% of all respondents who said that peace operations degrade their readiness. However the majority of combat support and SOF units maintained that the peace operations improved their combat readiness. This is logically attributed to the mission of those type units; for example military police, or signal units whose training level would benefit from operations where they perform their combat mission. Every respondent who was assigned to a health service unit during the deployment maintained that the operation had no impact.





Figure 14: Impact of Peace Operations on Readiness by Unit Type

Peeling the onion one layer further, the study examined how skills at various levels of the organization were affected by peace operations. I had the respondents assess the impact of readiness at individual through battalion levels. Their responses validated the commonly held view that peace operations are most beneficial at the platoon and lower levels and degrade combat readiness the most in company and higher organizations as Figure 15 shows. There is also a data trend away from the "no effect" response which decreased to about 20% across the levels in the 1999 survey as the enhanced or degraded responses increased proportionally.






Figure 15: Impact of Skills by Peace Operations

While the enhanced skills at the platoon and lower level is a benefit, the reduction of combat readiness at the company and higher level has serious implications, especially for Army and Marine forces who fight in team and task force organizations. This situation clearly reduces the ability of our military to execute the National Military Strategy of being able to transition directly from a peace operation to a MTW.

The study next looked back at the pre-deployment question of whether our METL tasks include or replicate the tasks required for peace operations and held it up to a mirror. I wanted to find out if the tasks the units conducted complimented or replicated their go-to-war METL and found an increasing number who believe that the skills required by the peace operation compliment these skills to at least some degree. Only 60% of those surveyed in 1997 believed this way, but 76% of 1998 and a full 93% of 1999 felt that the peace operations tasks benefited them to some degree or to a great degree. Dissention from this point of view was primarily held by the combat arms units where 45% felt that the peace operation either benefited them to a small degree or not at all.

Finally the study sought to discover whether units underwent normal readiness reporting procedures during the peace operation; using the Unit Status Report or its service equivalent. The respondents reported that 68% of the units maintained normal reporting procedures during their deployment. While this is down from the 81% reported for the 1998 group, this high percentage reflects the growing normalcy of these type operations within our military. Unlike a combat operation where different reporting procedures are employed, we are treating peace operations like garrison duty.

Yeedback from the queries that focused on what went on 'during the deployment' show that peace operations degrade some critical areas of our military's combat readiness even though being beneficial to small unit integrity (platoon and below) and complementing some of our go-to-war skills. Specifically, units deployed on peace operations have few opportunities to train and sustain their combat METL skills. Their readiness levels at the company and above level are languishing. They are not even afforded the opportunity to sustain or improve the peace operations skills that many had ramped-up for and dedicated four weeks of what could have been METL training to achieve.

The implications of this situation would not be as dire if the National Military strategy did not include the premise that our forces would be able to deploy directly from a peace operation to meet our MTW needs. Believing units deployed on six-month peace operations have this ability is self-delusional. Accepted, validated training doctrine requires routine sustainment training to preclude the loss of METL proficiency required for success on the battlefield. That training is clearly not occurring in our units deployed on peace operations.

SECTION III: POST-DEPLOYMENT

The study next focused questions on the period following the deployment. Was the unit allowed resources to properly recover

its personnel, equipment, and training to readiness standards required by a forward projection military; one that may be called upon to execute a MTW with little or no notice?

How long were the units given to recover? The average time for this year's class was approximately 3 ½ weeks, which is comparable to the previous two years of the survey. However, there was a huge increase in the percentage of respondents who experienced no recovery time - 33% in 1999 vice only 18% in the previous two years of the survey.




Figure 16: Allotted Recovery Period in Weeks

How did the respondents feel about the allotted time to recover? Surprisingly, the vast majority of the respondents believed the recovery time adequate for all but training. Only those who received no recovery time felt that the time was not

adequate - even then the belief was not unanimous with 75% believing zero weeks recovery inadequate for personnel and 70% believing it inadequate for equipment and training.




Figure 17: Was Recovery Time Adequate?

Those who felt the time inadequate for recovery cited numerous reasons to support their beliefs. Comments concerning detractors are varied but focus in the following areas: large numbers of personnel, especially critical MOSs, were reassigned shortly after returning from the deployment; lack of protected time to recover, for example, higher HQ tasking the units to assume missions of the units that replaced the recovering unit on the peace operation; lack of other resources (money, training areas). A full listing of the detractors respondents cited is located in Appendix F.

The comments in Appendix F provide some objective data to support those who reported the recovery time inadequate. The second key part of the discussion on the adequacy of recovery time is how was post operation combat readiness assessed?




Figure 18: Post-operations Assessment

As shown in Figure 18, the majority of the combat readiness evaluations the respondents of the last two classes underwent were commander's evaluations, not formal evaluations. The number of assessments involving actual field exercises: ARTEPs, CTC rotations, and exercises have all decreased from the first year of the survey. The percentage of those not undergoing any evaluation increased in this year's survey from the previous year. Of those experiencing only a commander's assessment, the unit commander performed 67% and the remainder were by commanders one and two levels higher.

This result brings into question the validity of the majority's assessment that their units had adequately recovered. With the majority of the assessment's being informal, an appropriate question is - by whose standard?

To further pursue the issue of post-operations readiness, the study asked how long, following recovery, would your unit require to successfully undergo an ARTEP, CTC rotation, or actually deploy and fight in an MTW. The amount of time required again decreased from the previous year with respondents now believing they require approximately five weeks to successfully prepare for the evaluations and a little more than 7 weeks to be ready to deploy to war. How does this relate to the majority's response that the allotted recovery time was adequate to restore combat readiness? It appears to reflect on the standard used to base the assessment of combat readiness. It also could indicate an institutional unwillingness to assess a unit as being not ready to deploy to war.




Figure 19: Time Required to Prepare for ARTEP, CTC, or MTW

Now that I established their opinions on recovery and the time required to execute a major combat METL related mission, I wanted to relate the two conditions. The study asked what the impact would be if they were denied the preparation time for the ARTEP, CTC, or MTW. The vast majority believed they would still accomplish the mission, though with varying degrees of casualties. The past two surveys showed that the majority believed they would suffer few (1998 - 52%, 1999 - 48%) or no casualties (1999 - 21%). This, again, appears to demonstrate the can-do ethos of the U.S. military.

The study next wanted to find out if the respondents believed we should include peace operations tasks in their unit METLs. A slight majority, 54%, of this year's respondents believed these tasks should be included. This is down from the previous two years where the data shows 67% of the 1997 class and 63% of the 1998 class believed the tasks should be part of the unit METL. This downward trend seems to inversely reflect the upward belief that peace operations tasks complement the current unit METLs.

As a follow on to the question of whether unit METLs should include peace operations tasks the study asked what portion of their unit METL they would be willing to give up to accommodate the inclusion of the tasks. The premise here being that with a limited number of training days available, adding new tasks

require reduction of other tasks. Forty-three percent of this year's class would be unwilling to give up any combat METL tasks to accommodate peace operations tasks. Another 53% would be willing to sacrifice between 10% and 30% of their current METL to allow for the peace operations tasks. This directly reflects the percentages that believe that peace operations should not and should (respectfully) be included in unit METLs.

The final questions concerned the effect of the peace operation on individuals. Was their physical fitness, morale, and retention affected and, if so, how.

The question on the effect on physical fitness was introduced last year. In both years the majority saw little or no change in their unit's fitness levels. Was this level assessed by a Service standardized test? This question was not asked and this data should be obtained in future studies.




Figure 20: Peace Operations Affect on Unit Physical Fitness

Recently, much has been written in various periodicals concerning the effect of numerous deployments for peace operations on unit morale. I thought that it would be appropriate to add to the survey questions on how these operations were affecting morale and morale's second order effects of re-enlistment and junior officer retention. Since these are new questions, this year's study was not able to compare them for trends from previous years.

Respondents to this year's survey contradicted numerous articles and anecdotal evidence claiming a decrease in unit morale due to numerous deployments to peace operations. The majority (55%) indicated that unit morale increased while on the peace operation. Another 27% indicated that unit morale was unaffected by the peace operation. Only three (4%) of the respondents indicated that their assessment was from a formal command climate survey which reduces objective credibility.




Figure 21: Affect on unit morale.

A second order effect of unit morale is retention rates. These are expressed as re-enlistment rates for the enlisted soldiers and retention rates for junior commissioned officers. Based on the positive response concerning morale, the impact of peace operations on both the re-enlistment rates and officer retention should be improved retention of both populations. Generally, the respondents did not validate this presumption as seen in Figures 22 and 23. Re-enlistment improved in only 24% of the responses and junior officer retention improved in only 17% compared to the reported 55% morale improvement. In both cases over 50% of the respondents reported no effect on retention due to the peace operation. At the other end of the spectrum 22% and 28% (respectively) attributed a decrease in the re-enlistment rate and junior officer retention rate to the These questions need further correlation in peace operation. future surveys in order to validate the data and draw more valid conclusions.




Figure 22: Effect on Re-enlistment




Figure 23: Effect on Junior Officer Retention

The final question provided the opportunity to make general comments concerning the peace operation the respondents participated in. Their comments are found in Appendix G.

Data gathered from questions concerning post-operations appears very positive - units require a short amount of time to recover from an average deployment of approximately five months and morale and retention are good. However, the assessments of these factors were primarily subjective versus formal objective evaluations. In order to make a meaningful assessment of the impact of peace operations we must conduct more objective evaluations of the areas that we routinely measure during peacetime training. Additionally the respondents report that the units require additional time following recovery to prepare for deployments to CTCs and even longer times to prepare for an

MTW. This time is not accounted for in the National Military Strategy and may not be available in a real world scenario!

SECTION IV: SURVEY ASSESSMENT & CONCLUSIONS

Anecdotal evidence questioning the effect of peace operations on our combat readiness continues to grow in the media. Stories such as a recent Washington Times report that stated "[s]oldiers [in Bosnia] constantly question the nature of peacekeeping operations. They feel the jobs are not skillspecific to the military." This feeling is strongly reinforced by recent congressional testimony by Colonel John D. Rosenberger Commander, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment (OPPOSING FORCES) National Training Center, Fort Irwin, California before the Military Readiness Subcommittee on National Security, United States House of Representatives. COL Rosenberger, a highly credible source reported to Congress that "the performance and combat readiness of brigade combat teams at the National Training Center has substantially declined the past 5 years."13 COL Rosenberger attributes a large portion of this decline to "expanding peacekeeping operations which quickly erode warfighting knowledge, skill, and ability, creating a growing generation of young leaders who don't know how to fight as members a combined arms team;..."14

Despite numerous studies and reports yielding results similar to those cited above there appears to be a (growing) acceptance of peace operations as normal operations. This is reflected not only in the responses of the survey concerning combat readiness and peace operations tasks but also at the military's highest levels via the requirement to continue peacetime readiness reporting procedures.

From the data gathered in this survey there are clear indications that the numerous and repetitive deployments are degrading our ability to meet the MTW requirements of the NMS and 1998 NSS. While many of the respondents indicated peace operations increased their combat readiness and that tasks essential to the peace operation complimented their METL tasks, they also reported a degradation of combat skills at the company and higher level, a need for additional time to prepare for combat related deployments, and inadequate time allocated to restore combat training to its appropriate level. In addition the absence of collective METL or common skills training for an average of five months would likely spell disaster for a unit required to deploy immediately to an MTW.

There is also an apparent lack of formalized evaluations to assess the impact of peace operations on readiness. It should be clear from this survey of future senior leaders that this objective data is not being collected. Units returning from

peace operations should be formally assessed as to their combat readiness (METL, CTT, and equipment), physical fitness, and morale. The formal assessments exist; we must use them. Only in this way can we validate or deny the NMS mandate that our units deploy directly from a peace operation environment to a theater of war. Only in this way can we substantiate or disprove the mounting pile of anecdotal evidence that says peace operations is rendering our military "Not Combat Ready"! The price of neglecting to do so may be the blood of numerous American soldiers, sailor, airmen, and marines who could be sent, unready, from a peace mission to a war.

RECOMMENDATIONS

This survey should be continued for several more years in order to further refine the data collected and identify trends that could clearly identify the effects of peace operations on our combat readiness. Once identified this information and its supporting documentation could be used to recommend national military policy changes to ensure our ability to accomplish all of our strategic objectives: Shape, Respond, and Prepare Now.

Units deploying to peace operations should undergo formal evaluations of the surveyed areas before deployment and after recovery to objectively assess the effects. We must determine to what degree a unit's and individuals' combat skills are

degraded during the peace operation. We must determine the appropriate time units require to restore those skills and if the data shows that a unit will not accomplish its mission if deployed directly for a peace operation to an MTW then we must change our National Military Strategy

After I began compiling the survey results it became clear from respondent comments and analysis of responses that the survey itself requires some reworking. Appendix H contains a revised survey that I recommend for use with next year's class.

Changes include:

- Expanding the population section to capture data from individuals who did not participate but may have joined a unit returning from a Peace Operation.
- Clarifying some of the questions to ensure the responses provide the data we need to analyze. For example, ensure that the questions concerning pre and post-deployment readiness assessments specify combat or peace operation readiness.
- Make a greater effort to obtain objective assessments vice subjective or anecdotal evidence.

An additional recommendation concerning the survey is to reformat it to a web based application, similar to the end of Course surveys conducted by the War College. This would allow

automated input of responses to the survey database and would greatly reduce the workload of the future researcher.

WORD COUNT: 5810

ENDNOTES

- Don Snider, "U.S. Civil-Military Relations and Operations Other Than War," <u>Civil-Military Relations and the Not-quite Wars of the Present and Future</u>, Vincent Davis, Editor. (Carlisle Barracks: SSI), 30 October 1996, 4.
- 2 Executive Summary, Presidential Decision Directive 25, $\underline{\text{U.S.}}$ Policy on Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations, (3 May 1994), 1. Hereafter cited as PDD 25.
- ³ Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, <u>National Military</u> <u>Strategy</u>. (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Defense), (1998), 7. Hereafter cited as NMS.
 - 4 Ibid. 8.
 - ⁵ Ibid., 9.
 - ⁶ Ibid, 10.
- ⁷ 2ID in Korea, 1ID in Germany, and 4ID in Fort Hood are not in a rapid deployment posture.
- ⁸ During the Support cycle a unit is limited to a small amount of individual level training due to the amount of support taskings it receives. Support cycle reduces the number of training days available by one third to 161.
- 9 Department of Defense, DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, Joint Pub 1-02. (Washington D.C.: U.S. Department of Defense), 1.
- Department of the Army, <u>Training the Force</u>, FM-25-101. (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of the Army),.
 - ¹¹ NMS, 9.
- 12 Sgt. G.B. Mediavilla, "U.S. Soldiers Fight Only Boredom In The Balkans," Washington Times, March 14, 1999, Pg. 8.
- Colonel John D. Rosenberger, Report to Military Readiness Subcommittee on National Security, United States House of Representatives, 106th Congress, 1st Session, 26 February 1999.

¹⁴ Tbid.

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 <u>Curriculum Course 2: War, National Policy & Strategy</u>.
 Carlisle Barracks: USAWC, 1998.

Dear Classmates:

I am preparing an SRP on the effect of Operations Other Than War (OOTW) or training readiness. As part of my research, I am surveying the members of our class for those with personal experiences in this area. Please answer the following questions to the best of your ability; feel free to attack additional information if you desire. This issue is critical to a number of ongoing strategic debates such as force structure, force size training, OOTW rotations, OOTW recovery operations, and reallocation of forces from OOTW to a MRC. Please return to BOX 178 NLT 24 January 1997. For additional information, you may contact me via comail (landrya) or at 258-1402. Thanks in advance for your help.
1. What is your <u>branch</u> of Service: [] Army [] Navy [] Air Force [] USMC [] Other (specify)
2. What is your component: [] Active [] Reserve
3. Have you ever participated in an OOTW (if "no" please go to question
5. What type of unit did you serve with during the OOTW deployment (mark all that apply): [] Combat (heavy) [] Combat (light) [] Combat Support [] Combat Service Support [] SOF [] CONUS based [] Europe based [] other location (specify) PREDEPLOYMENT QUESTIONS:
6. Did your unit METL include tasks required for the OOTW? [] None []
Few [] Most [] All
7. Did the OOTW require critical tasks not listed in your unit METL? [] No [] Yes (list below)
(a)(b)(c)

9 January 1997

8. How did your unit primarily train for critical OOTW tasks: [] Normal METL training program [] Special ramp up: weeks [] OJT
9. At deployment, how would you rate your unit's training readiness on normal METL skills: [] combat ready [] combat ready with minor limitations [] not combat ready
10. At deployment, how would you rate your unit's training readiness in critical OOTW Skills: [] Fully trained [] Trained (minor shortfalls) [] Significant shortfalls [] Untrained
11. How was your pre-deployment training readiness assessed: [] ARTEP [] CTC rotation [] other (specify) [] not assessed `
DURING OOTW DEPLOYMENT
12. Compared to home station, <u>METL task training opportunities during the OOTW</u> were: [] Greater [] Same [] Somewhat less than [] Much less than [] Non-existent
13. Did your unit conduct other training (such as non-METL OOTW task training) during the OOTW: [] Not at all
14. Assess the overall impact of the OOTW on your unit's combat training readiness: [] no impact [] improved overall combat training readiness [] minimally degraded combat training readiness [] substantially degraded combat training readiness
15. Which skills were significantly enhanced by the OOTW: [] Individual [] Crew [] Squad [] Platoon [] Company [] Battalion [] other
16. Which skills were significantly degraded by the OOTW: [] Individual [] Crew [] Squad [] Platoon [] Company [] Battalion [] other

17. To what extent did your OOTW tasks complement or replicate your
critical go-to-war tasks: [] Not at all [] To a small degree [] To some degree [] To a great degree
18. During the OOTW, were normal Unit Status Report reporting standards and criteria used to report readiness: [] No [] Yes (specify)
POST DEPLOYMENT These questions apply to those who either deployed, or joined a unit in post-deployment recovery:
19. After your unit returned, how long was your unit's <u>dedicated</u> recovery period: [] no recovery [] 1 week [] 2 weeks [] 3 weeks [] 1 month [] 2 months []months
20. Was the time allotted sufficient to restore your unit to full combat readiness in the following categories: Personnel: [] Yes [] No Equipment: [] Yes [] No Training: [] Yes [] No
21. What were the main factors which degraded unit training readiness after the OOTW (please list): (a)(b)(c)
22. How was your unit's training readiness assessed after recovery: [] ARTEP [] CTC rotation [] other (specify) [] not assessed
23. How soon after the return of your unit do you believe it would have been able to successfully execute a(n): a. ARTEP: b. CTC Rotation (NTC/CMTC/JRTC): c. MRC:
24. Had your unit been called upon to deploy to an MRC <u>prior</u> to the time you listed above, do you think the impact of <u>training readiness shortfalls</u> would have resulted in: [] mission failure [] mission success with significant casualties [] mission success with moderate casualties [] mission success with few casualties

25. Do [] No		eve that <u>OC</u>		uld be includ	led in unit MET	<u>Ls</u> :
METL ta	sks are y	ou willing	constraints,	what percent in order to t	of your warfig	hting OOTW
tasks (circle b 10	pelow): 20_	30	40	50	60_
27. Arcomment	e there a on?	any other <u>(</u>	OOTW training	readiness is	sues you would	. like to

Dear Classmates:

I am preparing an SRP on the effect of Operations Other Than War (OOTW) on training readiness. This issue is critical to a number of ongoing strategic debates such as force structure, force size, training, OOTW rotations, OOTW recovery operations, and reallocation of forces from OOTW to a MTW.

As part of my research, I am surveying the members of our class for those with personal experiences in this area. Please answer the following questions to the best of your ability; feel free to attach additional information if you desire.

<u>Please return to BOX 282, NLT 24 November 1997</u>. For additional information, you may contact me via e-mail (walshmj1) or at 240-0619. **Thanks in advance for your help!**

Mike Walsh/ Seminar 13

⊥.	what is your branch of Service:
[]	Army
[]	Navy
[]	Air Force
[]	USMC
[]	Other (specify)
2.	What is your component:
[]	Active
[]	Reserve
[]	Guard
[]	Civilian
3.	Have you ever participated in a Operation Other Than War
(OOTV	N)?
[]	Yes, one OOTW
[]	Yes, two OOTWs
[]	Yes, three or more
[]	No - Please go to Question # 18

Please answer questions 4 through 30 separately for each OOTW in which you participated. To minimize reproduction I've only included two copies of these questions and ask that you please make the additional copies if you've participated in more than two OOTWs.

4a. Operation (name):

<pre>4b. Operation Type: [] humanitarian assistance [] traditional peace keeping [] peace enforcement [] domestic support [] other: specify:</pre>
4c. Duration of your involvement: (MM/YY- MM/YY):
4d. Position (i.e., Battalion/Squadron Cdr., XO, staff):
<pre>4e. Type of Unit [] Combat (heavy) [] Combat (light); [] Combat Support; [] Combat Service Support; [] Special Operations [] Health Services [] Other: Specify:</pre>
4f. Unit normal basing
<pre>[] CONUS based [] Europe based [] Other location (specify)</pre>
PREDEPLOYMENT QUESTIONS:
5). Did your unit Mission Essential Task List (tasks critical for you to accomplish your primary assigned mission) include tasks required for the OOTW? [] None [] Few [] Many [] Most [] All
<pre>6. Did the OOTW require critical tasks not listed in your unit METL? [] No [] Yes (list below)</pre>

	(e) (f) (g)
[] []	How did your unit primarily train for critical OOTW tasks? Normal METL training program Special ramp up: weeks OJT (On-the-Job Training) on location Other: Specify:
readion it	At deployment, how would you rate your unit's training iness Is normal METL skills: Combat ready (e.g. C-1) Combat ready with minor limitations (e.g., C-2) Combat ready with major limitations (e.g., C-3) Not combat ready
readi [] [] []	At deployment, how would you rate your unit's training iness in critical OOTW Skills Fully trained Trained (minor shortfalls) Significant shortfalls Untrained
(sele	How was your pre-deployment training readiness assessed: ect one) ARTEP or Service standardized training evaluation. Combat Training Center rotation (NTC, JRTC, CMTC). Exercises BCTP or Automated/Simulation Evaluation Cdr.'s assessment. If so, which commander? Other (specify): Pre deployment readiness was Not assessed
	DURING OOTW DEPLOYMENT
[] [] [] L [] []	Much less Non-existent Did your unit conduct other training (such as non-METL OOT)
task	training) during the OOTW?

<pre>[] Not at all [] Small degree [] Moderate degree [] Great degree</pre>
13. Did your unit specifically address <u>common task skills</u> such as weapon qualifications, PT and NBC training during the OOTW? [] Not at all [] Moderate degree [] Some degree [] Great degree
14. Assess the overall impact of the OOTW on your unit's combat training readiness [] Substantially improved overall combat training readiness [] No impact [] Minimally degraded combat training readiness [] Substantially degraded combat training readiness
15. Which skills were significantly: enhanced/degraded/no change by the OOTW: (select all that apply) Individual [] Enhanced [] Degraded [] Same Crew [] Enhanced [] Degraded [] Same Squad [] Enhanced [] Degraded [] Same platoon [] Enhanced [] Degraded [] Same Company [] Enhanced [] Degraded [] Same Battalion [] Enhanced [] Degraded [] Same other: specify:
16. To what extent did your OOTW tasks complement and/or replicate your critical go-to-war tasks: [] Not at all [] To a small degree [] To some degree [] To a great degree
17. During the OOTW, were normal Unit Status Report (USR) reporting standards and criteria used to report readiness: [] Yes [] No (specify):

POST DEPLOYMENT

These questions apply to those who either deployed, or joined a unit in post-deployment recovery:

18. After your unit returned, how long was your unit's dedicated recovery period. That is how long did your higher
headquarters allow you to provide leave time to your soldiers, service your equipment and train to your services established standards on your go-to-war tasks before assessing your readiness or declaring you were ready to deploy to war. [] No recovery [] 1 week [] 2 weeks [] 3 weeks [] 1 month [] 2 months [] 3 months
19. Was the time allotted sufficient to restore your unit to full combat readiness in the following categories: Personnel: [] Yes [] No Equipment: [] Yes [] No Training: [] Yes [] No
20. If your unit experienced <u>degraded unit training after</u> the OOTW, what were the main factors, (training detractors), which impacted (please list) (a) (b) (c)
21. How was your unit's training readiness assessed after recovery:-Select one - [] ARTEP or Service standardized training evaluation. [] Combat Training Center rotation (NTC, JRTC, CMTC). [] BCTP or Automated/Simulation Evaluation [] Exercises [] Cdr.'s assessment. If so, which commander? [] Other (specify) [] Post Deployment Readiness was NOT Assessed
<pre>22. After the OOTW, did you notice a measurable impact with your unit's physical fitness: [] Large Improvement [] Small Improvement [] No impact [] Small decrease [] Large decrease</pre>

23. How many weeks after the return of your unit do you believe it would have been able to successfully execute a(n) a. ARTEP or Service standardized training evaluation: weeks b. CTC Rotation(NTC/CMTC/JRTC): weeks c. MTW:weeks
24. Had your unit been called upon to deploy to an MTW prior to the time you listed above, do you think the impact of training readiness shortfalls would have resulted in: [] Mission failure [] Mission success with significant casualties [] Mission success with moderate casualties [] Mission success with few casualties [] Mission success with few casualties [] N/A. The unit experienced no training readiness shortfalls.
25. Do you believe that OOTW tasks should be included in unit METLs: [] Yes [] No 26. Given realistic time constraints, what percent of your warfighting METL tasks are you willing to neglect in order to train on OOTW tasks:
[] None [] 1 - 10% [] 61- 70 % [] 11 - 20% [] 71- 80% [] 21 - 30% [] 81- 90 % [] 31 - 40% [] 91- 100 %
27. Are there any other OOTW training readiness issues you would like to comment on? Thanks for your help. Please return to BOX 282, NLT 24 November 1997. For additional information, you may contact me via e-mail (walshj1) or at 240-0619.

Dear Classmates:

I am preparing an SRP on the effect of Peace Operations on training readiness. This issue is critical to a number of ongoing strategic debates such as force structure, force size, training, rotating units during a Peace Operation, recovery operations following a Peace Operation, and reallocation of forces from Peace Operations to a MTW.

As part of my research, I am surveying the members of our class for those with personal experiences in this area. Please answer the following questions to the best of your ability; feel free to attach additional information if you desire. $\underline{\text{This}}$ survey should take approximately 15 - 20 minutes of your time.

All responses will be strictly confidential. Your participation is strictly voluntary. You can obtain a copy of the survey results by contacting me via the e-mail address below.

<u>Please return to BOX 219, NLT 20 November 1998</u>. For additional information, you may contact me via e-mail (nizolakj) or at 796-2223. **Thanks in advance for your help!**

Joe Nizolak/ Seminar 16

1.	What is your branch of Service:
[]	Army
[]	Navy
[]	Air Force
[]	USMC
[]	Other (specify)
2.	What is your component:
[]	Active
[]	Reserve
[]	Guard
[]	Civilian

- 3. Have you ever participated in a Peace Operation: Peace keeping, Peace enforcement, Humanitarian Assistance, etc.?
- [] Yes, one Peace Operation
- [] Yes, two Peace Operations
- [] Yes, three or more
- [] No Please go to Question # 18

Please answer questions 4 through 30 separately for each Peace Operation in which you participated. To minimize reproduction I've only included two copies of these questions and ask that you please make the additional copies if you've participated in more than two Peace Operations.

4a. Operation (name):
<pre>4b. Operation Type: [] humanitarian assistance [] traditional peace keeping [] peace enforcement [] domestic support [] other: specify:</pre>
4c. Duration of your involvement: (MM/YY- MM/YY):
4d. Position (i.e., Battalion/Squadron Cdr., XO, staff):
<pre>4e. Type of Unit [] Combat (heavy) [] Combat (light); [] Combat Support; [] Combat Service Support; [] Special Operations [] Health Services [] Other: Specify:</pre>
4f. Unit normal basing
<pre>[] CONUS based [] Europe based [] Other location (specify)</pre>
PREDEPLOYMENT QUESTIONS:
5). Did your unit Mission Essential Task List (tasks critical for you to accomplish your primary assigned mission) include tasks required for the Peace Operation? [] None [] Few [] Many [] Most [] All

<pre>6. Did the Peace Operation require critical tasks not listed in your unit METL? [] No [] Yes (list below) (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g)</pre>
7. How did your unit <u>primarily</u> train for <u>critical Peace</u> Operation tasks? [] Normal METL training program [] Special ramp up: weeks [] OJT (On-the-Job Training) on location [] Other: Specify:
8. At deployment, how would you rate your unit's training readiness on its normal METL skills: [] Combat ready (e.g. C-1) [] Combat ready with minor limitations (e.g., C-2) [] Combat ready with major limitations (e.g., C-3) [] Not combat ready
9. At deployment, how would you rate your unit's <u>training readiness</u> in critical <u>Peace Operation Skills</u> [] Fully trained [] Trained (minor shortfalls) [] Significant shortfalls [] Untrained
<pre>10. How was your pre-deployment training readiness assessed: (select one) [] ARTEP or Service standardized training evaluation. [] Combat Training Center rotation (NTC, JRTC, CMTC). [] Exercises [] BCTP or Automated/Simulation Evaluation [] Cdr.'s assessment. If so, which commander? [] Commander commanding the unit. [] Commander one level up. [] Commander two levels up. [] Other (specify):</pre>
[] Pre deployment readiness was Not assessed

DURING Peace Operation DEPLOYMENT

11. Compared to home station, METL task training opportunities
during the Peace Operation were:
[] Much greater
[] Greater
[] Same
[] Less
[] Much less
[] Non-existent
12. Did your unit conduct other training (such as non-METL
Peace Operation task training) during the Peace Operation?
[] Not at all
[] Small degree
[] Moderate degree
[] Great degree
[] Great degree
13. Did your unit specifically address common task skills such
as weapon qualifications, PT and NBC training during the Peace
Operation?
[] Not at all
[] Moderate degree
[] Some degree
[] Great degree
14. Assess the overall impact of the Peace Operation on your
unit's combat training readiness:
[] Substantially improved overall combat training readiness
[] Improved overall combat training readiness
[] No impact
[] Minimally degraded combat training readiness
[] Substantially degraded combat training readiness
15. Which skills were significantly: enhanced/degraded/no change
by the Peace Operation: (select all that apply)
Individual [] Enhanced [] Degraded [] Same
Crew [] Enhanced [] Degraded [] Same
Squad [] Enhanced [] Degraded [] Same
platoon [] Enhanced [] Degraded [] Same
Company [] Enhanced [] Degraded [] Same
Battalion [I Enhanced [] Degraded [] Same
other: specify:

16. To what extent did your Peace Operation tasks complement
and/or replicate
your critical go-to-war tasks:
[] Not at all
[] To a small degree
[] To some degree
[] To a great degree
17. During the Peace Operation, were normal Unit Status Report (USR) reporting standards and criteria used to report readiness: [] Yes [] No (specify):
POST DEPLOYMENT
These questions apply to those who either deployed, or joined a
unit in post-deployment recovery:
10 76th and the street of the land of the street of the st
18. After your unit returned, how long was your unit's
dedicated recovery period. That is how long did your higher
headquarters allow you to provide leave time to your soldiers,
service your equipment and train to your services established
standards on your go-to-war tasks before assessing your
readiness or declaring you were ready to deploy to war.
[] No recovery
[] 1 week
[] 2 weeks
[] 3 weeks
[] 1 month
[] 2 months
[] 3 months
19. Was the time allotted sufficient to restore your unit to full combat readiness in the following categories:
Personnel: [] Yes [] No
Equipment: [] Yes [] No
Training: [] Yes [] No
OO TO TO THE STATE OF THE STATE
20. If your unit experienced degraded unit training after the
Peace Operation, what were the main factors, (training
detractors) , which impacted (please list)
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
(e)

21. How was your unit's training readiness assessed after recovery:-Select one - [] ARTEP or Service standardized training evaluation. [] Combat Training Center rotation (NTC, JRTC, CMTC). [] BCTP or Automated/Simulation Evaluation [] Exercises [] Cdr.'s assessment. If so, which commander? [] Commander commanding the unit. [] Commander one level up. [] Commander two levels up. [] Other (specify) [] Post Deployment Readiness was NOT Assessed
<pre>22. After the Peace Operation, did you notice a measurable impact with your unit's physical fitness: [] Large Improvement [] Small Improvement [] No impact [] Small decrease [] Large decrease</pre>
23. How many weeks after the return of your unit do you believe it would have been able to successfully execute a(n) a. ARTEP or Service standardized training evaluation.: weeks b. CTC Rotation(NTC/CMTC/JRTC): weeks c. MTW: weeks
24. Had your unit been called upon to deploy to an MTW prior to the time you listed above, do you think the impact of training readiness shortfalls would have resulted in: [] Mission failure [] Mission success with significant casualties [] Mission success with moderate casualties [] Mission success with few casualties [] N/A. The unit experienced no training readiness shortfalls. 25. Do you believe that Peace Operation tasks should be included in unit METLs: [] Yes [] No

26.	Give	n r	ealis	stic	tim	e c	onstr	raints,	what	percent	01	your	
wari	Eight	ing	METI	ta	sks	are	you	willing	, to	neglect	in	order	to
trai	in on	Pe	ace ()per	atio	n ta	asks:						

[] 1	None				[]	51-	60 9	ó
[]	1 - 1	10%				[] 61-	· 70 %		
[]	11	-	20%		[]	71-	80%	
ΓЭ	21	200/				[] 81-	90 %		
LJ	21 -	30%				[] 01-	70 70		
]			40%		[]			양

- 27. What is your assessment of the impact of this Peace Operation on unit morale.
- [] Unit morale greatly improved.
- [] Unit morale improved slightly.
- [] Unit morale remained the same.
- [] Unit morale slightly decreased.
- [] Unit morale greatly decreased.
- [] Is your assessment from a command climate survey? [] Yes
- [] No.
- 28. What is you assessment of the impact of this Peace Operation on unit re-enlistment?
- [] Re-enlistment rates greatly improved.
- [] Re-enlistment rates slightly improved.
- [] Re-enlistment rates remained the same.
- [] Re-enlistment rates slightly decreased.
- [] Re-enlistment rates greatly decreased.
- 29. What is you assessment of the impact of this Peace Operation on junior officer retention? That is, did the operation increase, decrease, or have no affect on the officers' desire to stay in service?
- [] Retention greatly improved.
- [] Retention slightly improved.
- [] Retention remained the same.
- [] Retention slightly decreased.
- [] Retention greatly decreased.
- 30. Are there any other <u>Peace Operation training readiness</u> issues you would like to comment on?

Thanks for your help.

Please return to BOX 219, NLT 20 November 1998.

For additional information, you may contact me via e-mail (nizolakj) or at 796-2223.

Dear Classmates:

I am preparing an SRP on the effect of Peace Operations on training readiness. This issue is critical to a number of ongoing strategic debates such as force structure, force size, training, rotating units during a Peace Operation, recovery operations following a Peace Operation, and reallocation of forces from Peace Operations to a MTW.

As part of my research, I am surveying the members of our class for those with personal experiences in this area. Please answer the following questions to the best of your ability; feel free to attach additional information if you desire. This survey should take approximately 15 - 20 minutes of your time.

All responses will be strictly confidential. Your participation is strictly voluntary. You can obtain a copy of the survey results by contacting me via the e-mail address below.

Please return to BOX 219, NLT 20 November 1998. For additional information, you may contact me via e-mail (nizolakj) or at 796-2223. Thanks in advance for your help!

Joe Nizolak/ Seminar 16

1.	What	is	your	branch	of	Service:

- [85] Army
- [3] Navy
- [5] Air Force
- [1] USMC
- [1] Other (specify)
- What is your component:
- [83] Active
- [6] Reserve
- [4] Guard
- [3] Civilian
- 3. Have you ever participated in a Peace Operation: Peace keeping, Peace enforcement, Humanitarian Assistance, etc.?
- [32] Yes, one Peace Operation
- [10] Yes, two Peace Operations
- [6] Yes, three or more
- [47] No Please go to Question # 18

Please answer questions 4 through 30 separately for each Peace Operation in which you participated. To minimize reproduction I've only included two copies of these questions and ask that you please make the additional copies if you've participated in more than two Peace Operations.

4a. Operation (name):
4b. Operation Type: [17] humanitarian assistance [7] traditional peace keeping [34] peace enforcement [7] domestic support [6] other: specify:
4c. Duration of your involvement: Average of 145 days
4d. Position (i.e., Battalion/Squadron Cdr., XO, staff):
<pre>4e. Type of Unit [12] Combat (heavy) [11] Combat (light); [11] Combat Support; [14] Combat Service Support; [2] Special Operations [11] Health Services [4] Other: Specify:</pre>
4f. Unit normal basing
<pre>[45] CONUS based [23] Europe based [4] Other location (specify)</pre>

PREDEPLOYMENT QUESTIONS:

- 5). Did your unit Mission Essential Task List (tasks critical for you to accomplish your primary assigned mission) include tasks required for the Peace Operation?
- [52] None
- [11] Few
- [27] Many
- [12] Most
- [14] All

your [45]	<pre>id the Peace Operation require <u>critical tasks</u> not listed in unit METL? No Yes (list below)</pre>
	(a) (b) (c)
	(d)
	(e) (f)
	(g)
7. I	How did your unit primarily train for critical Peace
	ation tasks?
	Normal METL training program Special ramp up: weeks
	OJT (On-the-Job Training) on location
	Other: Specify:
8. 7	At deployment, how would you rate your unit's training
read:	iness
	ts normal METL skills:
	Combat ready (e.g. C-1)
	Combat ready with minor limitations (e.g., C-2) Combat ready with major limitations (e.g., C-3)
	Not combat ready
	At deployment, how would you rate your unit's <u>training</u> iness in critical Peace Operation Skills
	Fully trained
[49]	Trained (minor shortfalls)
	Significant shortfalls
[]	Untrained
	How was your pre-deployment training readiness assessed:
	ect one)
	ARTEP or Service standardized training evaluation. Combat Training Center rotation (NTC, JRTC, CMTC).
	Exercises
	BCTP or Automated/Simulation Evaluation
[30]	Cdr.'s assessment. If so, which commander?
	[11] Commander commanding the unit.
	[13] Commander one level up.
[2]	<pre>[6] Commander two levels up. Other (specify):</pre>
	Pre deployment readiness was Not assessed

DURING Peace Operation DEPLOYMENT

- 11. Compared to home station, <u>METL task training opportunities</u> during the Peace Operation were:
- [9] Much greater
- [16] Greater
- [7] Same
- [12] Less
- [15] Much less
- [11] Non-existent
- 12. Did your unit conduct other training (such as non-METL Peace Operation task training) during the Peace Operation?
- [22] Not at all
- [23] Small degree
- [20] Moderate degree
- [5] Great degree
- 13. Did your unit specifically address <u>common task skills</u> such as weapon qualifications, PT and NBC training during the Peace Operation?
- [22] Not at all
- [16] Moderate degree
- [17] Some degree
- [15] Great degree
- 14. Assess the overall <u>impact of the Peace Operation</u> on your unit's <u>combat training readiness</u>:
- [4] Substantially improved overall combat training readiness
- [25] Improved overall combat training readiness
- [7] No impact
- [23] Minimally degraded combat training readiness
- [11] Substantially degraded combat training readiness
- 15. Which skills were significantly: enhanced/degraded/no change by the Peace Operation: (select all that apply)

by the Peace	oper	ation: (se	Tect	<u>all</u> that	apply)	
Individual	[31]	Enhanced	[24]	Degraded	[13]	Same
Crew	[23]	Enhanced	[20]	Degraded	[16]	Same
Squad	[22]	Enhanced	[20]	Degraded	[15]	Same
platoon	[18]	Enhanced	[22]	Degraded	[15]	Same
Company	[20]	Enhanced	[26]	Degraded	[14]	Same
Battalion	[18]	Enhanced	[28]	Degraded	[11]	Same
other: speci:	fy:			_		

- 16. To what extent did your Peace Operation <u>tasks</u> <u>complement</u> and/or replicate
- your critical go-to-war tasks:
- [5] Not at all
- [14] To a small degree
- [28] To some degree
- [22] To a great degree
- 17. During the Peace Operation, were normal Unit Status Report (USR) reporting standards and criteria used to report readiness:
- [49] Yes
- [23] No
- (specify):

POST DEPLOYMENT

These questions apply to those who either deployed, or joined a unit in post-deployment recovery:

- 18. After your unit returned, how long was your unit's dedicated recovery period. That is how long did your higher headquarters allow you to provide leave time to your soldiers, service your equipment and train to your services established standards on your go-to-war tasks before assessing your readiness or declaring you were ready to deploy to war.
- [24] No recovery

[1] 6 Months

- [7] 1 week
- [9] 2 weeks
- [3] 3 weeks
- [15] 1 month
- [4] 2 months
- [9] 3 months
- 19. Was the $\underline{\text{time allotted sufficient}}$ to restore your unit to full combat readiness in the following categories:

Personnel: [41] Yes [24] No Equipment: [41] Yes [24] No Training: [30] Yes [35] No

- 20. If your unit experienced <u>degraded unit training</u> <u>after</u> the Peace Operation, what were the main factors, (training detractors), which impacted (please list)
- (a)
- (b)
- (c)
- (d)
- (e)

Appendix D: 1999 Survey Totals

- 21. How was your unit's <u>training readiness assessed</u> **after** recovery:-Select one -
- [11] ARTEP or Service standardized training evaluation.
- [9] Combat Training Center rotation (NTC, JRTC, CMTC).
- [4] BCTP or Automated/Simulation Evaluation
- [5] Exercises
- [30] Cdr.'s assessment. If so, which commander?
 - [20] Commander commanding the unit.
 - [4] Commander one level up.
 - [6] Commander two levels up.
- [1] Other (specify)
- [11] Post Deployment Readiness was NOT Assessed
- 22. After the Peace Operation, did you notice a measurable impact with your unit's physical fitness:
- [1] Large Improvement
- [6] Small Improvement
- [31] No impact
- [28] Small decrease
- [6] Large decrease
- 23. How many weeks after the return of your unit do you believe it would have been able to successfully execute a(n)
 - a. ARTEP or Service standardized training evaluation .:

5.3 weeks

- b. CTC Rotation(NTC/CMTC/JRTC):5.6 weeks
- c. MTW: 7.2 weeks
- 24. Had your unit been called upon to deploy to an MTW <u>prior</u> to the time you listed above, do you think the impact of <u>training</u> readiness shortfalls would have resulted in:
- [0] Mission failure
- [1] Mission success with significant casualties
- [22] Mission success with moderate casualties
- [35] Mission success with few casualties
- [15] N/A. The unit experienced no training readiness shortfalls.
- 25. Do you believe that Peace Operation tasks should be included in unit METLs:
- [39] Yes
- [33] No

Appendix D: 1999 Survey Totals

26. Given realistic time constraints, what <u>percent of your</u> warfighting METL tasks are you willing to neglect in order to train on Peace Operation tasks:

[31]	None	[1]	51- 60 %
[15]	1 - 10%	[]	61- 70 %
[12]	11 - 20%	[]	71- 80%
[11]	21 - 30%	[]	81- 90 %
[1]	31 - 40%	[]	91- 100 %
[1]	41 - 50%		

- 27. What is your assessment of the impact of this Peace Operation on unit morale.
- [20] Unit morale greatly improved.
- [20] Unit morale improved slightly.
- [20] Unit morale remained the same.
- [10] Unit morale slightly decreased.
- [3] Unit morale greatly decreased.
- [] Is your assessment from a command climate survey? [3] Yes [70] No.
- 28. What is you assessment of the impact of this Peace Operation on unit re-enlistment?
- [4] Re-enlistment rates greatly improved.
- [14] Re-enlistment rates slightly improved.
- [38] Re-enlistment rates remained the same.
- [16] Re-enlistment rates slightly decreased.
- [0] Re-enlistment rates greatly decreased.
- 29. What is you assessment of the impact of this Peace Operation on junior officer retention? That is, did the operation increase, decrease, or have no affect on the officers' desire to stay in service?
- [2] Retention greatly improved.
- [10] Retention slightly improved.
- [40] Retention remained the same.
- [17] Retention slightly decreased.
- [3] Retention greatly decreased.
- 30. Are there any other <u>Peace Operation training readiness</u> issues you would like to comment on?

Thanks for your help.

Please return to BOX 219, NLT 20 November 1998.

For additional information, you may contact me via e-mail (nizolakj) or at 796-2223.

Appendix E: Question 6 - Critical Peace Operations Tasks

The following comments were received in response to Question 6 of the survey: Did the Peace Operation require <u>critical tasks</u> not listed in your unit METL?

- Negotiation
- Negotiation skills
- Observe
- Operate mobilization support center crisis action team
- PSYOPS
- Public relations
- Refugee management
- Response to Disturbances/Riot Control
- Site inspections: Arms, HQ, storage
- Work with other service (USAF) military police.
- Inducement of consent
- Weapons storage site inspections
- Static LPs/Ops
- Provide LNO to COCOM, CINC and TF HQ
- Civil military operations
- Media operations
- Providing security to refugee compound
- Establishing checkpoints, refugee camps, and security points
- QRF and riot control.
- Consensus building
- Check point security
- Interface with Multi-national Force staff
- Search and seizure operations
- Voting supervision. Establishing and securing polling booths.
- Learning key cultural aspects of nation we are assisting.

Appendix F: Question 20 - Post-deployment Training Detractors

The following comments were received in response to Question 20 of the survey: If your unit experienced <u>degraded unit</u>

<u>training after</u> the Peace Operation, what were the main factors,

(training detractors), which impacted (please list):

- Requirement to assume scheduled foreign exchange training without delay.
- Lack of time to regain skills while taking care of soldiers' personal needs
- Changes to schedule from higher HQ.
- Damage to unit equipment prohibited training at 100% effectiveness.
- Continuing Central region missions
- PERSTEMPO
- Time available
- On going commitments
- No time to train on mobility & counter-mobility
- OPTEMPO
- Poor relationship between deployed soldiers & new soldiers who arrived and remained in unit (rear) during the deployment.
- Garrison Support requirements.
- Soldiers departing the service due to adverse impact on their civilian job.
- Lack of available resources
- Reduced aircraft readiness levels reduced training opportunities
- Vehicle readiness was not FMC until six months after redeployment
- Simultaneous operations created a high OPTEMPO/PERSTEMPO
- Taskings the unit was "Red" cycle for four of the six recovery months.
- Lack of resources for collective training (squad level and higher)
- No dedicated recovery time.
- No dedicated training time
- Reintegration of deployed and stay behind forces.
- Low priority in parts and fuel \$\$. (Improves as deployment nears.)
- Personnel turnover once deployment was complete

Appendix F: Question 20 - Post-deployment Training Detractors

- Weather (winter @ Fort Drumm)
- OPTEMPO
- No resources (time and money) allocated to restore equipment to C-1 level.
- Preparation for Quarterly Training Brief
- Immediate deployment for other operations
- OPTEMPO
- Preparation for Division BCTP
- Lack of fenced time to achieve standards
- Assumed additional support requirements of units that replaced our unit on the deployment
- Accelerated Deployment cycle
- Increase in normal workload to cover another deployed unit
- Equipment remained in theater with the replacement unit
- Ramp-up training for division warfighter.
- Soldiers' skills during the Peace OPN
- O&M Funding depleted.
- Senior grade personnel shortages
- Continued operations which did not account for degradation of time to train MTW tasks
- Critical Upcoming Mission (Atlantic Resolve)
- No ability to do complex breaching
- Equipment in poor state of maintenance.
- Time to have equipment returned.
- Lack of adequate time
- No funds available to conduct remedial training for the skill degradation.
- Personnel turbulence in critical leadership positions.
- Focus was on units supported by the PSB vice internally.
- Replacement of equipment left in Bosnia detracted from training.
- PERSTEMPO
- XVIII ABC Inspector General Preparation
- Preparation for Battalion Re-stationing
- Loss of currency in required combat essential skills.
- Unit experienced increased attrition.
- Change of gunnery exercise to an earlier date.
- Numerous 179 day taskings for low density/Sr. personnel
- Availability of training opportunities
- Lack of routine training events
- Troop leave & personal time to resolve issues that occurred during deployment.

Appendix F: Question 20 - Post-deployment Training Detractors

- 50% turnover of personnel shortly after returning home.
- BDE and Division BCTPs
- Poor equipment readiness due to inadequate recovery time.
- Demonstrations (Dog & Pony Shows), IG Inspections
- Equipment readiness
- Overdue equipment services.

Appendix G: Question 30 - Other Issues

The following comments were received in response to Question 30 of the survey: Are there any other Peace Operation training readiness issues you would like to comment on?

- "Our soldiers enjoyed the change of pace provided by the MFO. They were in excellent spirits throughout. No outside distractions. Squad cohesiveness improved."
- "Peace operations are part of the NSS and NMS, they are not 2nd level missions. They shape the world in order to prevent more costly operations. They are critical, mission essential!"
- "Units should train for war. Most PO tasks can be covered during train-up periods. The exception may be NEO and handling civilians which will be part of all combat operations."
- "Units such as mine (construction engineers) actually employ their wartime METL skills to a much higher degree while deployed than at home station. We are somewhat of an exception."
- "Joint Endeavor was controversial for the soldiers due to the political haggling over when to go in, what the objectives were. Poor and conflicting explanations by political leaders added to the confusion. This operation seriously degraded our ability to accomplish our prime MTW tasks for a combat engineer unit."
- "Current force packaging for Division and Corps forward deployed units do not take into account the impact of IFOR type operations on readiness. The Army needs to re-look this in order to allow METL proficiency while conducting sustained Peace Operations."
- "A mastery of METL skills lends itself to transition to Peace Operations in a short time (3 weeks)."
- "Small unit leadership skills enhanced. Battlefield ethical decision-making."
- "Short deployments in the Air Guard have a positive impact on individual morale."
- "Unit was still deployed when I returned to attend AWC."
- "During this operation we set up and ran a field hospital for Cuban Refugees in Indiantown, PA. Our entire METL, less force protection, was trained with real world patients."

Appendix G: Question 30 - Other Issues

- "Peace operations are combat operations. Our METL supported our combat tasks. We were able to conduct training throughout this deployment."
- "Training for peace operations should be limited to preparation for deployment to one of these type missions."

APPENDIX H: PROPOSED 2000 SURVEY

1. [] [] []	What is your <u>branch</u> of Servi Army Navy Air Force USMC Other (specify)	ice:			
	What is your <u>component</u> : Active Reserve Guard Civilian				
3. inclu	Do you believe that <u>Peace Opluded in unit METLs:</u> Yes	pera	tion t	asks should	<u>be</u>
[]					
warf	Given realistic time constrating METL tasks are you with on Peace Operation tasks:				
[]	None []]	51- 60 61- 70 71- 80 81- 90	8	
[]	1 - 10% []		61- 70	용	
[]	11 - 20% []		71- 80	ଚ	
[]	21 - 30% []		81- 90	용	
[]	31 - 40% []]	91- 10	0 %	
[]	41 - 50%				
5. keep: [] []	Have you ever participated in ing, Peace enforcement, Human Yes, one Peace Operation Yes, two Peace Operations Yes, three or more - please	nita	rian A	ssistance, e	etc.?
[]	No, but I joined a unit just				
	operation.				
[]	No, I've never participated	or	joined	a recently	aebroλeq

ALL OTHER RESPONDENTS PLEASE CONTINUE...

Please answer questions 6 through 33 separately for each Peace Operation in which you participated OR which the unit you joined participated.

6a. Operation (name):	
<pre>6b. Operation Type: [] humanitarian assistance [] traditional peace keeping [] peace enforcement [] domestic support [] other: specify:</pre>	
6c. Duration of your or the unit's involvement: (MM/YY- MM/YY):
6d. Position (i.e., Battalion/Squadron Cdr., XO, staff):	
<pre>6e. Type of Unit [] Combat (heavy) [] Combat (light); [] Combat Support; [] Combat Service Support; [] Special Operations [] Health Services [] Other: Specify:</pre>	
6f. Unit normal basing	
<pre>[] CONUS based [] Europe based [] Other location (specify):</pre>	
PREDEPLOYMENT QUESTIONS:	
7. Did your unit's Mission Essential Task List (tasks critical for you to accomplish your primary assigned mission) include tasks required for the Peace Operation? [] None [] Few [] About half [] Most [] All	

your unit	ne Peace (: METL? (list bel	-	require	critical	tasks	not	listed	in
Operation [] Norr [] Spec [] OJT	did your und tasks? mal METL to the cial ramp (On-the-corr Specification of the corr specifica	raining pup: vob Traini	orogram weeks		ritical	. Pea	ace	
readiness [] Comb [] Comb	deployments on its ready oat ready oat ready combat re	ormal MET (e.g. C-1 with mind with majo	<u>TL skills</u> l) or limita	<u>s</u> : ations (e	e.g., (C-2)	aining	
	was your p (select o		yment ME1	TL <u>trainir</u>	ng read	dines	<u>ss</u>	
[] Comb [] Exer [] BCTI [] Cdr	EP or Servont Training cises P or Autom 's assess Commande Commande Commande er (specification)	nated/Simusment. In commander commander one lever two leverty):	r rotation for so, which ding the vel up.	on (NTC, Sevaluation ich commar unit.	JRTC, (
readines: [] Full [] Trai	deployments in critically trained (mino since)	ical <u>Peace</u> d or shortfa	e Operat: alls)			s <u>tra</u>	aining	

13.	How was your pre-deployment Peace Operation training
read	iness assessed:
(sel	ect one)
[]	ARTEP or Service standardized training evaluation.
[]	Combat Training Center rotation (NTC, JRTC, CMTC).
[]	Exercises
	BCTP or Automated/Simulation Evaluation
	Cdr.'s assessment. If so, which commander?
	[] Commander commanding the unit.
	[] Commander one level up.
	[] Commander two levels up.
ſı	Other (specify):
[]	Pre deployment readiness was Not assessed
F]	rie deproyment readiness was not assessed
14.	Compared to home station, METL task training opportunities
duri	ng the Peace Operation were:
	Much greater
	Greater
	Same
_	Less
	Much less
	Non-existent
r j	NOT CALDUCTE
15.	Did your unit conduct other training (such as non-METL
Peace	e Operation task training) during the Peace Operation?
	Not at all
	Once or twice during the deployment
	Occasionally (monthly)
	Routinely (weekly or more)
	is a second of mode,
16.	Did your unit specifically address common task skills such
as we	eapon qualifications, PT and NBC training during the Peace
Opera	ation?
[]	Not at all
[]	Once or twice during the deployment
[]	Occasionally (monthly)
[]	Routinely (weekly or more)
	<u> </u>
17.	Assess the overall impact of the Peace Operation on your
unit'	's combat training readiness:
[]	Substantially improved overall combat training readiness
[]	Improved overall combat training readiness
[]	No impact
[]	Minimally degraded combat training readiness
[]	Substantially degraded combat training readiness

APPENDIX H: PROPOSED 2000 SURVEY

18. Which skills were significantly: enhanced/degraded/no change
by the Peace Operation: (select all that apply)
Individual [] Enhanced [] Degraded [] Same
Crew [] Enhanced [] Degraded [] Same
Squad [] Enhanced [] Degraded [] Same
platoon [] Enhanced [] Degraded [] Same
Company [] Enhanced [] Degraded [] Same
Battalion [I Enhanced [] Degraded [] Same
other: specify:
19. To what extent did your Peace Operation tasks complement and/or replicate your critical go-to-war tasks: [] Not at all [] To a small degree - 25% or less match. [] To some degree - 50% match. [] To a great degree - 75% or greater match. 20. During the Peace Operation, were normal reporting standards and criteria used to report readiness (e.g., Unit Status Report (USR)): [] Yes [] No, we used different reporting criteria.
[] No, we were not required to report. 21. After your unit returned, how long was your unit's dedicated recovery period. That is how long did your higher headquarters allow you to provide leave time to your soldiers,
service your equipment and train to your services established
standards on your go-to-war tasks before assessing your readiness or declaring you were ready to deploy to war.
[] No recovery
[] 1 week [] 2 weeks [] 3 weeks [] 1 month [] 2 months [] 3 months [] Over 3 months
22. Was the time allotted sufficient to restore your unit to full combat readiness in the following categories: Personnel: [] Yes [] No Equipment: [] Yes [] No
Training: [] Yes [] No

23. How was your unit's METL training readiness assessed

APPENDIX H: PROPOSED 2000 SURVEY

fitness? [] Service standard physical fitness test. [] Informal assessment such as number unable to complete unit run. [] Subjective assessment. 29. What is your assessment of the impact of this Peace Operation on unit morale. [] Unit morale greatly improved. [] Unit morale improved slightly. [] Unit morale remained the same. [] Unit morale slightly decreased. [] Unit morale greatly decreased. 30. Is your assessment of morale from a command climate survey? [] Yes [] No 31. What is you assessment of the impact of this Peace Operation on unit re-enlistment? [] Re-enlistment rates greatly improved. [] Re-enlistment rates remained the same.
[] Subjective assessment. 29. What is your assessment of the impact of this Peace Operation on unit morale. [] Unit morale greatly improved. [] Unit morale improved slightly. [] Unit morale remained the same. [] Unit morale slightly decreased. [] Unit morale greatly decreased. [] Unit morale greatly decreased. 30. Is your assessment of morale from a command climate survey? [] Yes [] No 31. What is you assessment of the impact of this Peace Operation on unit re-enlistment? [] Re-enlistment rates greatly improved. [] Re-enlistment rates slightly improved.
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Operation on unit re-enlistment? [] Re-enlistment rates greatly improved. [] Re-enlistment rates slightly improved.
[] Re-enlistment rates slightly decreased.[] Re-enlistment rates greatly decreased.
32. What is you assessment of the impact of this Peace Operation on junior officer retention? That is, did the operation increase, decrease, or have no affect on the officers' desire to stay in service? [] Retention greatly improved. [] Retention slightly improved. [] Retention remained the same. [] Retention slightly decreased. [] Retention greatly decreased.
33. Are there any other Peace Operation training readiness issues you would like to comment on?
Thanks for your help.

Please return to BOX , NLT